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The Liability of Foreign Government Entities: First 
National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio 
Exterior De Cuba 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Governments throughout the world, either in their own names or through 
agents or instrumentalities, engage in commercial transactions. l If disputes relat-
ing to these transactions occur, the government's claim of sovereign immunity2 
or the application by a court of the act of state doctrine3 may prevent plaintiffs 
from bringing a lawsuit against the government or its agent or instrumentality. 
By initiating a lawsuit, however, a government waives its sovereign immunity.4 
I. In 1976, fifty-nine of the 500 largest industrial corporations headquartered outside the United 
States were government-owned state enterprises. D. LAMONT, FOREIGN STATE ENTERPRISES 30 (1979). 
These fifty-nine enterprises accounted for 20.7 percent of the 1976 total sales of the 500 corporations. 
/d. at 250. In 1982, the number of government-owned state enterprises in "The International 500" had 
increased to sixty-five and comprised 18.5 percent of total sales. See The InterruUional 500, FORTUNE, 
August 22, 1983, at 172-81 (data calculated by author). 
2. Under a principle of absolute sovereign immunity, a country is exempt from the jurisdiction of 
any other country and can be sued only with its consent. G. VON GLAHN, LAw AMONG NATIONS 139 (4th 
ed. 1981). Both the United States and England, however, have adopted a restrictive principle of 
sovereign immunity, under which immunity is restricted to a foreign government's sovereign, but not 
commercial, activities. The U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976) 
[hereinafter cited as FSIAj, codifies this approach. See, e.g., von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33 (1978); Note, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: 
Giving The Plaintiff His Day in Court, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 543 (1977). The comparable law in England is 
The State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, §§ 1-23 (reprinted in 48 Halsbury's Statutes of England 85 (3rd ed. 
1978». See Delaume, The State Immunity Act of the United Kingdom, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 185 (1979). 
One distinction between the two statutes is in the treatment of instrumentalities established by a 
government as autonomous entities. The FSIA includes those entities in its definition of a foreign state 
and thereby affords them immunity. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (1976); Carey v. National Oil Corp., 453 F. 
Supp. 1097, 1100 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (corporation created and wholly owned by libya is a "foreign state" 
for purposes of the FSIA), aff'd, 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979). See also infra note 58. The State Immunity 
Act, however, expressly excludes these entities from immunity. The State Immunity Act, 1978 at § 
14( 1). This distinction may be of limited practical significance since governments establish these entities 
generally to engage in commercial activities and neither statute provides sovereign immunity for such 
activities. The State Immunity Act does provide immunity to an autonomous entity engaged in a 
sovereign act for which its government could have claimed immunity. Id. at § 14(2). For a comparison of 
the two statutes, see Delaume, supra, and Brower, Bisdine, Jr. and Loomis, Jr., The Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act of 1976 in Practice, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 200, 210 (1979). 
3. The act of state doctrine dictates that domestic courts will not judge the validity of sovereign acts 
performed by a foreign government within its own territory. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 
U.S. 398,428 (1964); See infra note 59 and G. VON GLAHN, supra note 2, at 152. 
4. First National City Bank v. Banco Para EI Comercio Exterior De Cuba, 103 S. Ct. 2591, 2603 
(1983); The State Immunity Act § 2(3). See also infra note 92 and G. VON GLAHN, supra note 2, at 150. 
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Defendants can therefore bring a claim, by way of a setoff or counterclaim,5 
from which they might otherwise have been barred had the government not 
brought the initial lawsuit.6 
An associated issue concerns the relationship between a government instru-
mentality and the government that established it. Since a government may 
establish an instrumentality as a separate legal entity,1 the question arises 
whether that entity, if it initiates a lawsuit, should be subject to a setoff or 
counterclaim based not on its actions but on the actions of the establishing 
government.8 
In the United States, the recent case of First National City Bank v. Banco Para El 
Comercio Exterior De Cuba (Bancec)9 raised the issue of whether a foreign govern-
ment entity should be given a separate juridical status.tO If afforded such a status, 
the entity would be legally distinct from its government, and opposing parties 
could not hold it liable for actions of that government.ll Additionally, the 
government entity could not claim sovereign immunity even if the government 
itself would be entitled to such immunity.i2 The U.S. approach, as indicated by 
the Supreme Court's decision in Bancec, is to deny the claimed separate juridical 
status of a government entity when the Court believes it would be inequitable to 
recognize the separate status.13 In contrast, English courts have consistently 
recognized this separate status.14 
This Comment examines the juridical status afforded government entities by 
courts in the United States and in England. The Comment focuses first on the 
nature of government entities, the reasons why they generally should be af-
forded an independent status, and the possible ramifications if they are not. The 
5. A setoff is "a counter demand which a defendant holds against a plaintiff arising out of a 
transaction extrinsic of plaintiff's cause of action." Howard Johnson, Inc. of Florida v. Tucker, 157 F.2d 
959,961 (5th Cir. 1946). A setoff is raised pursuant to Rule 13 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The goal of Rule 13(b), which states that any claim may be raised as a counterclaim against an opposing 
party, is to resolve all controversies between the parties in a single lawsuit. See Alaska Barite Co. v. 
Freighters, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 192, 195 (N.D. Cal. 1972); see also C. WRIGHT Be A. MILLER, 6 FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1420 (1971). For an early history of the concept of setoff, see Note, TM 
Development of Set-Off, 64 U. PA. L. REv. 541 (1916). 
6. FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1607; The State Immunity Act § 2(6). See also infra note 92 and accompanying 
text. 
7. See infra § II. 
8. See infra notes 90 Be 91 and accompanying text. 
9. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 505 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd sub 
nom. First National City Bank v. Banco Para EI Comercio Exterior De Cuba, 658 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1981), 
rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 2591 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Bancee). 
10. For the purposes ofthis Comment, the terms "separate legal personality" and "separate juridical 
status" are interchangeable. 
II. Baneec, 103 S. Ct. at 2597; 658 F.2d at 917. 
12. 103 S. Ct. at 2599. See also Friedmann, Government Enterprise: A Comparative Analysis, in GoVERN-
MENT ENTERPRISE: A COMPARATIVE sTuDY 303, 314 (W. Friedmann and J. Garner eds. 1970). See also 
infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. 
13. Bancee, 103 S. Ct. at 2603. See also infra notes 91-101 and accompanying text. 
14. See infra § IV. 
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author then analyzes the Bancee decision!; in which the Court allowed a setoff, 
based on actions of the Cuban government, against a Cuban government entity 
claiming to be independent of that government. 16 Finally, the Comment discuss-
es how English courts have handled this issue. Although English courts have not 
been faced with the specific question of whether to allow a setoff, they have 
decided the more general issue of whether to consider a government entity as 
separate from the government that created itP The author concludes that the 
English approach of giving effect to the claimed separate status of government 
entities is preferable because of the potential negative ramifications of not doing 
so, such as the disruption of commercial transactions. ls The author further 
concludes that the Court in Baneee should have taken the English approach. 
II. THE NATURE OF GOVERNMENT ENTITIES 
An autonomous government entityl9 is created by a government, wholly or 
partially owned by that government, and established to perform a variety of 
functions, often of an economic nature.20 These entities have a separate legal 
personality, which distinguishes them from government departments.21 To have 
a separate legal personality, the entity must be able to sue and be sued, enter into 
contracts, be liable in tort, hold and dispose of property, have its own name, and 
keep its assets and liabilities distinct from those of the government, even if the 
entity is a legal part of the government.22 
As long as these entities perform, in some respect, a governmental responsibil-
ity, they will not be financially or bureaucratically independent from the gov-
ernment that created them.23 Governments finance these entities either by mak-
ing periodic appropriations or by providing them with capital assets,24 and 
15. 103 S. Ct. 2591 (1983). 
16. [d. at 2593. 
17. Stt infra § IV. 
18. Ste infra notes 185-187 and accompanying text. 
19. This Comment discusses government instrumentalities that governments establish as separate 
juridical entities. One type of autonomous government entity is a public or government enterprise. such 
as a public or government corporation. See generally Friedmann, supra note 12. at 306-07. These 
government corporations also are referred to as government proprietary corporations. Thurston. 
Government Proprittary Corporations, 21 VA. L. REv. 351. 351-52 (1935). For purposes of this Comment. 
the author will use the term 'government entity' to refer to instrumentalities. enterprises. or public 
corporations that the creating government intends to be legally separate from the government. 
20. THURSTON. supra note 19. at 351-52. One commentator states that the difference between a 
government completely owning a company and holding a controlling or strong minority interest is a 
difference only of degree. Friedmann. supra note 12. at 311. 
21. Friedmann. supra note 12. at 314. 
22. [d. at 315. Ste also United Nations Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs. Organization. Manage-
ment and Supervision of Public Enterprises in Developing Countries 64. U.N. Doc. ST/TAO/M/65. 
U.N. Sales No. E.74.11.H.4 (1974) [hereinafter cited as U.N. Study]. 
23. Friedmann. supra note 12. at 320. 326. 
24. [d. at 319. Set also Brief for Respondent at 12. Baneu. 103 S. Ct. 2591. But set U.N. Study. supra 
note 22. at 64 (except for capital appropriations or to cover losses. a public corporation is generally 
independendy financed). 
130 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. VIII, No.1 
profits are generally remitted to the state.25 Moreover, the government usually 
exercises general direction over the entity.26 Governments create these entities 
for many purposes, including state trading.27 The Soviet Union and other 
communist and socialist countries are the major state traders,28 since they con-
duct most or all of their trade in this manner.29 State trading is not unique, 
however, to the communist and socialist countries. In the United States, for 
example, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Energy Research and 
Development Administration handle the sale of nuclear fuel.30 In England, the 
British National Oil Corporation conducts the exploration, production, and sale 
of North Sea oil.31 
Although government entities are intended to be separate from the creating 
governments, conflicts arise when parties bring suits against these entities. If a 
court does not consider a government entity as separate, the government entity 
is immune from suit in the same manner as the creating sovereign.32 As a 
separate entity, however, it is liable to suit. The United States and England 
handle this issue similarly. In England, these entities do not enjoy the privileges 
and immunities of the government,33 and in the United States, the ability of the 
entities to sue and be sued has been construed as constituting a waiver of 
sovereign immunity.34 If the entity initiates a lawsuit, it is subject to setoff or 
counterclaims based on its actions. The Bancec case raised the question whether 
the entity could be subject to a setoff based on actions of the government that 
created it. 
25. Friedmann, supra note 12, at 321; Brief for Respondent at 12, Baneee, 103 S. Ct. 2591. 
26. Friedmann, supra note 12, at 325-26; Brief for Respondent at 12-13, Banet<, 103 S. Ct. 2591. 
27. A government is engaged in state trading when it conducts and controls foreign trade. This 
control is exercised in several ways. The state can own a trading enterprise, directly control a private 
enterprise, or grant exclusive or special privileges to the private enterprise. Ianni, State Trading: Its 
Nature and International Treatment, 5 Nw.]. INT'L L. 8< Bus. 46, 48 (1983). 
28. Id. at 49. Major state traders include the Soviet Union, Poland, Romania, and East Germany.ld. 
See also Brief for Respondent at a6-all, Baneee, 103 S. Ct. 2591, for a survey of government corpora-
tions, primarily in the developing countries. 
29. Ianni, supra note 27, at 49. See also I Congreso del Partido, [1980]1 LLOYD'S L.R. 23, 25 (C. A.) 
(government entrusts commerce of Cuba to state trading enterprises). 
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014, 2073-74 (1976). Congress vested the right to sen "special nuclear material" in 
the Atomic Energy Commission. Id. The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 abolished the Atomic 
Energy Commission and transferred its functions to the Administrator of the Energy Research and 
Development Administration and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (1976). 
These are not government entities as the term is used in this Comment. See also]. JACKSON, LEGAL 
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 1046 n.2 (1977). 
31. Millard, The Legal Environment of the British Oil Industry, 18 TULSA L.]. 394,432, 446 (1983). 
32. But to the extent the entity is engaged in commercial activity, it would not be entitled to sovereign 
immunity in either the United States or in England. See supra note 2. 
33. Friedmann, supra note 12, at 313; Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977]1 
Q.B. 529, 559. See also Tamlin v. Hannaford, [1950] 1 K.B. 18, 22-24 (holding that the British 
Transport Commission, a British statutory commission, was not entitled to the privileges and immunity 
of the Crown). 
34. Bancee, 103 S. Ct at 2599; Abel, The Public Corporation in the United States, in GOVERNMENT 
ENTERPRISE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 181, 198-99 (W. Friedmann and]. Garner eds. 1970). 
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While the separate status of a government entity, such as a state trading 
corporation, had never been considered by the U.S. Supreme Court before the 
Baneee case,35 the legal status of these entities has been the subject of scholarly 
comment. One commentator, for example, states that these entities should be 
considered as separate from their governments36 and that sovereign immunity 
should not be extended to them.37 He suggests further that courts, when consid-
ering the entities' legal status, reflect on the appropriateness of affording them 
sovereign immunity.3s He believes that if courts did so, they would conclude that 
the entities are legally separate from their governments not only for purposes of 
sovereign immunity but also in other legal contexts.39 
The Revised Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
supports the position that a government instrumentality is a legally distinct 
entity. Section 452 states that a claim resulting from the activity of a state 
instrumentality may be brought against that instrumentality or against the 
state.40 The Restatement further recognizes, however, that these instrumen-
talities are usually responsible only for their own activities,41 and that in order for 
the liability of the state to be imputed to the instrumentality, the state and 
instrumentality must have a relationship both to one another and to the claim.42 
The effects of disregarding the independent status of government entities 
such as state trading corporations are numerous.43 Commercial dealings involv-
ing countries that use trading corporations could be adversely affected if the 
independent status of these entities were ignored by U.S. courts.44 In addition, 
were the independent status of a government entity ignored, governments could 
be sued based not on their conduct but rather on the actions of the separate 
entity.45 
Courts in the United States and in England have recognized that government 
entities generally should be afforded a status separate from the government 
35. Bancec, 103 S. Ct. at 2598 n.12. 
36. W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 352 (1964). 
37. Friedmann, supra note 12, at 335-36. U.S. courts have generally refused to recognize sovereign 
immunity as a defense for a state trading entity. Note, The Liability of Foreign Governments Under United 
States Antitrust Laws, II GA. J. OF INT'L &: COMPo L. 103, III (1981); Fensterwald, United States Policies 
Toward State Trading, 24 LAW &: CONTEMP. PROB. 369,369 (1959). 
38. FRIEDMANN, supra note 36, at 350. 
39. [d. 
40. RESTATEMENT(REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 452 (Tent. 
Draft No.2, 1981). 
41. [d. at § 452, comment d. 
42. [d. at § 452, reporter's note 2. As an example of this requisite relationship, the RESTATEMENT 
refers to Banco Nacional de Cuba V. First National City Bank, 478 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1973). See infra 
notes 61-65 and accompanying text. 
43. See infra § V. 
44. See infra notes 185-87 and accompanying text. 
45. Gibbons V. Republic of Ireland, 532 F. Supp. 668, 671-72 (D.D.C. 1982). 
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which created them.46 However, while English courts presume the independent 
status of a government entity,47 the U.S. Supreme Court has, in a precedent-
setting case, held a government entity liable for the acts of its government.48 
Since this holding has far-reaching ramifications, the Court's decision in Bancec 
bears close examination. 
III. U.S. TREATMENT OF AUTONOMOUS GOVERNMENT ENTITIES 
A. Expropriation Cases Prior to Bancec 
The Cuban revolution in 1959,49 and Cuba's subsequent expropriation50 of 
U.S. citizens' investments in 1960, produced a significant amount of litigation in 
U.S. courts.51 Most of this litigation arose in the following manner. Property 
owned by U.S. citizens would be nationalized and expropriated, as authorized by 
46. See infra notes 90 & 177 and accompanying text. 
47. See infra § IV. 
48. Bancee, 103 S. Ct. at 2603. 
49. The Cuban revolution began on January 1, 1959. Baneee, 505 F. Supp. at 419. After the 
overthrow of the Batista regime, Castro and Che Guevara established a new national government. Id. 
This new government increased its ownership and control over the means of production and placed 
restrictions on international trade with Cuba. Id. 
50. An expropriation is a "transfer of ownership in a property to the State or one of its subordinate 
organs for reasons of public interest with prompt, effective and full (or adequate) compensation." G. 
SCHWARZENBERGER & E. BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 84 (6th ed. 1976). This expropria-
tion was authorized by the Cuban government on July 6, 1960, in retaliation for the July 6th reduction 
by Congress of Cuba's sugar quota in the United States. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 
398, 401 (1964). 
51. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961),afJ'd, 307 F.2d 
845 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (act of state doctrine precluded court from hearing case 
that involved determination of validity of Cuba's acts of expropriation), on remand sub nom. Banco 
Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957 and 272 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (Hickenlooper 
Amendment to Foreign Assistance Act of 1964 prohibited court from declining to hear case based on 
act of state doctrine when claim was based on a taking in violation of international law; case dismissed 
because plaintiff obtained title to sugar in violation of international law), afJ'd, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 
1967), Cirt denied, 390 U.S. 956, reh. denied, 390 U.S. 1037 (1968); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First 
National City Bank of N.Y., 270 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), rev'd, 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970), 
vacated and remanded, 400 U.S. 1019, rev'd on remand, 442 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd and remanded, 406 
U.S. 759 (1972), afJ'd on remand, 478 F.2d 191 (211 Cir. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Citibank] (action by 
Cuban national bank to recover from Citibank excess amounts received on the sale of a loan; court 
allowed counterclaim by Citibank for the value of its investment lost due to the expropriation of its 
assets by the Cuban government); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 505 F. Supp 412 
and 514 F. Supp. 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981) (setoff by Chase Manhattan Bank 
allowed against a valid claim of Cuban national bank for losses due to expropriation of Chase's assets by 
Cuba); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank New York, 658 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1981) (counterclaim 
by Chemical Bank not allowed for losses due not to the expropriation of its property but rather the 
property of a corporation that owed it money); Menendez v. Faber, Cae & Gregg, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 527 
(S.D.N.Y.1972), modified sub nom. Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. 
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976) (refusal of Cuban government 
to repay funds mistakenly paid to it by Dunhill for pre-intervention shipments of cigars was not an act of 
state). See generally Casenote, iI.et of State Doctrine: Determining its Viability in a Suit Involving an Expropria-
tion by Cuba of Foreign Owned Asset5, 14 LAW. AM. 337 (1982). 
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the Cuban government and carried out by an instrumentality of that govern-
ment.52 In response to this expropriation, the U.S. companies involved, often 
U.S. banks,53 would respond with self-help actions directed at Cuban govern-
ment entities. These actions included withholding the proceeds of a loan due to 
Banco Nacional de Cuba54 or failing to pay an undisputed letter of credit to 
Bancec.55 These Cuban entities would subsequently bring suit in the United 
States to recover the withheld or unpaid amounts.56 The defendant U.S. banks 
would then claim a setoff for the value of the expropriated property. The setoff 
claims raised the issue of whether these entities of the Cuban government would 
be afforded a separate juridical status by U.S. courts, or whether they would be 
held responsible for the expropriations and thus have their claims subjected to a 
setoff.57 
Prior to the Bancec case, the U.S. Supreme Court had never addressed the 
issue of the separate status of foreign government entities.58 When cases arising 
52. An example of such an instrumentality is Banco Nacional de Cuba, which carried out the 
expropriation of the Cuban branches of the U.S. banks. Citibank, 478 F.2d at 193-94. 
53. See, e.g., Bancec, 103 S. Ct. 2591; Chase, 658 F.2d 875; Citibank, 478 F.2d 191; Chemical Bank New 
York, 658 F.2d 903. 
54. Citibank, 270 F.2d at 1006. 
55. Baneec, 103 S. Ct. at 2594. A letter of credit is a document issued by a bank which promises to pay 
to the beneficiary the price of certain goods if the parties comply with the terms contained in the 
document. R. SPEIDEL, R. SUMMERS & J. WHITE, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 942 (1969). See generally 
Thayer,Irrevocable Credits in International Commerce: Their Legal Nature, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 1031 (1936). 
56. Instrumentalities of the Cuban government have the right to sue in U.S. courts. Sabbatino, 376 
U.S. at 412. 
57. Bancu, 103 S. Ct. at 2593. 
58. /d. at 2598 n.12. U.S. courts have considered the nature of these entities under the FSIA. In 
Verlinden, B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), afj'd on other grounds, 
647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983), the court held 
that it had jurisdiction over the Central Bank because the bank was an agent or instrumentality of a 
foreign state. This holding was compelled by the FSIA, which states that a "foreign state" includes an 
agency or instrumentality of that state and further defines agency or instrumentality as including any 
entity "which is an organ of a foreign state ... or whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a 
foreign state." 28 u.S.C. § 1603 (1976). The legislative history of the FSIA specifically includes state 
trading corporations within the definition of an agency or instrumentality. H.R. REp. No. 1487, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 6604, 6614 [hereinafter cited as 
REpORT]. See also East Europe Domestic Intern. Sales Corp. v. Terra, 467 F. Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), 
afj'd without apinion, 610 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1979) (state trading corporation conceded it was a foreign 
state for purposes of the FSIA); S & S Machinery Co. v. Masinexportimport, 706 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 
1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 161 (1983) (Romanian state-owned export/import company is an agency or 
instrumentality of a foreign state for purposes of the FSI A). 
None of these cases discussed whether the entity could be considered an alter ego of the government 
so that a claim against the government could be set off against the entity. The FSIA does not resolve this 
issue, as the House Report states: 
This bill is not intended to affect the substantive law of liability. Nor is it intended to affect ... 
the attribution of responsibility between or among entities of a foreign state; for example, 
whether the proper entity of a foreign state has been sued, or whether an entity sued is liable in 
whole or in part for the claimed wrong. 
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out of the Cuban expropriations first came before the Court, it had held that the 
act of state doctrine59 barred judicial consideration of these cases.60 In First 
National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,61 however, the Court reversed its 
position and held that the act of state doctrine did not prohibit it from consider-
ing the acts of expropriation.62 
On remand, the Second Circuit held that a setoff against Banco Nacional 
would be allowed because Banco Nacional had expropriated the U.S. property in 
Cuba for the Cuban government.63 The Second Circuit subsequently heard 
several cases involving claims by Cuban government entities and counterclaims 
for setoff by U.S. banks for the value of their expropriated property.64 It allowed 
the setoffs only when the entity had been involved in the expropriation or at least 
had benefited from it.65 
REPORT at 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 6610. The Bamec Court also recognized 
that the FSIA did not control the issue of whether a government entity could be held liable for acts of 
that government. 103 S. Ct. at 2597. 
59. The act of state doctrine dictates that U.S. courts will not judge the validity of sovereign acts 
performed by a foreign government within its own territory. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428. The doctrine is 
based on constitutional underpinnings arising out of the separation of powers and is rooted in judicial 
deference to the executive branch's authority over foreign affairs. Id. at 423, 427-28. 
Chief Justice Fuller articulated the act of state doctrine: "Every sovereign state is bound to respect the 
independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on 
the acts of the government of another done within its own territory." Underhill V. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 
250,252 (1897). See generally RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES §§ 428-29 (Tent. Draft No.4, 1983); Comment, The Act of State Doctrine: A History of judicial 
Limitations and Exceptions, 18 HARV. INT'L L. J. 677 (1977). 
A similar statement regarding English law is found in A.M. Luther V. James Sagor & Co., [1921) 3 
K.B. 532, 548. See also Princess Paley Olga v. Weisz, [1929)1 K.B. 718, 736. English courts, like those in 
the United States, have limited the application of the act of state doctrine. If the sovereign act violates 
international law, the act of state doctrine will not prevent English courts from examining the validity of 
the act. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Jaffrate, [1953) I W.L.R. 246, 258-59. 
60. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba V. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
61. 406 U.S. 759 (1972). 
62. !d. at 768. A divided court indicated several rationales for this decision. Justice Rehnquist, joined 
by Chief Justice Burger and Justice White, concluded that the Act of State doctrine did not apply 
because the executive branch had indicated that application of the doctrine would not advance U.S. 
foreign policy.Id. Justice Douglas, concurring in the judgment, stated that the Court's earlier decision 
in National Bank V. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1954) controlled. First National City Bank V. 
Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. at 770. Justice Powell, also concurring, stated that the act of state 
doctrine did not apply because there was no showing that, by hearing the case, the Court would 
interfere with U.S. foreign relations. !d. at 775-76. Commentators have given this case extensive 
treatment. See, e.g., Note, Act of State, 14 HARV. INT'L L. J. 131 (1973); Note, New Indications of 
justiciability of American Claims Against Cuban Expropriation, 52 B.U. L. REV. 847 (1972). The issue 
discussed by these commentators was not whether Banco Nacional should be held responsible for the 
acts of the Cuban government, but rather whether the act of state doctrine precluded court examination 
of the acts of expropriation. 
63. Citibank, 478 F.2d at 193. 
64. Chase, 658 F.2d 875; Baneec, 658 F.2d 913; Chemical Bank New York, 658 F.2d 903. 
65. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 428, reporter's 
note 8 (Tent. Draft No.4, 1983). See also infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. 
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B. The Bancec Case 
1. Facts 
The Cuban government established Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba 
(Bancec) on April 25, 1960 as an autonomous credit institution with its own 
juridical personality.66 It was intended to serve as Cuba's exclusive agent in 
foreign trade67 and, as such, had the ability to buy goods in Cuba and sell them 
abroad68 as well as to finance Cuban organizations engaged in foreign com-
merce.69 The Cuban government provided the initial working capital; 70 if Bancec 
required additional funds, it could raise them by issuing bonds and other 
securities in its own name.71 The Cuban government received all of Bancec's 
profits, after a deduction for capital reserves,72 and Bancec was managed by a 
governing board of delegates from Cuban ministries and a general manager 
appointed by the governing board.73 In these respects, Bancec was typical of 
government trading corporations established by other countries.74 
On August 12, 1960, Bancec agreed to purchase sugar from the National 
Agrarian Reform Institute75 and sell it to the Cuban Canadian Sugar Company.16 
To support the contract, Citibank issued an irrevocable letter of credit in favor of 
Bancec.77 Bancec assigned this letter of credit to Banco Nacional for collection.18 
On September 15, 1960, Banco Nacional presented Bancec's draft to Citibank 
for collection.79 The next day, the Cuban government nationalized the Cuban 
branches of Citibank, the Chase Manhattan Bank, and the First National Bank of 
66. Bancee, 103 S. Ct. at 2593. 
67. !d. 
68. Baneec, 658 F.2d at 915. As characterized by the district court, its function was "to manage the 
export of commodities for the account of the Government." 505 F. Supp. at 425. 
69. Baneec, 658 F.2d at 915. 
70. ld. Since the Cuban government supplied all of Bancec's capital, it consequently was its sole 
shareholder. 103 S. Ct. at 2593. 
71. See Joint Appendix to Petitioner's and Respondent's Brief at 43-44, Baneec, 103 S. Ct. 2591. 
72. 658 F.2d at 915. The court of appeals stated that the purpose of the capital reserves was for the 
"proper operation" of the bank.ld. In this respect, the remittance of profits to the Cuban government is 
similar to a corporate dividend payment, which is a payment to shareholders of profits earned over and 
above the amount of a corporation's capital. 11 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS § 5318 (Perm. ed. 1971). 
73. Baneec, 658 F.2d at 915. 
74. See supra notes 19-27 and accompanying text. See also Brief for Respondent at 12-14, Baneee, 103 
S. Ct. 2591. 
75. The National Agrarian Reform Institute was an instrumentality of the Cuban government which 
owned and operated the nationalized sugar industry. Baneec, 103 S. Ct. at 2593. 
76. Bancee, 658 F.2d at 915. 
77. Baneec, 103 S. Ct. at 2593-94. 
78. [d. at 2594. 
79. !d. 
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Boston by expropriating them.80 Shortly thereafter, Citibank credited the 
amount of the letter of credit to Banco Nacional's account and then applied the 
balance in that account as a setoff against its losses due to the Cuban expropria-
tion.81 
2. The Lower Court Decisions 
Bancec instituted its action to recover on the letter of credit in the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York on February 1, 1961.82 The district 
court determined that although Bancec was an autonomous institution under 
Cuban law, it was really not independent under U.S. law, but rather an alter ego 
of Cuba.83 The court held that a setoff, therefore, should be allowed and 
80. Baneee, 658 F.2d at 916. On July 6, 1960, the Cuban government authorized the nationalization 
of property located in Cuba belonging to U.S. citizens. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. Cuban 
Law 891, passed on October 13, 1960, authorized Banco Nacional to carry out the nationalization 
through expropriation. Baneee, 103 S. Ct. at 2594. It is beyond the scope of this Comment to discuss the 
expropriation without compensation of the Cuban branches of U.S. banks as a violation of international 
law; however, U.S. courts have ruled that it did constitute such a violation. Citibank, 270 F. Supp. at 
1010; Sabbatino, 307 F.2d at 868. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 185 (1965); REPORT,supra note 58, at 19-20, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS at 6618 ("The term 'taken in violation of international law' would include the nationalization or 
expropriation of property without payment of the prompt, adequate, and effective compensation 
required by international law. It would also include takings which are arbitrary or discriminatory in 
nature"). 
No international consensus exists, however, on this issue. Note, Creating a Framework for the Re-
introduetwn of International Law to Controversies Over Compensation for Expropriatwn of Foreign Investments, 9 
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 163, 163-64 (1982). The U.S. position is not followed by a majority of 
member states of the United Nations General Assembly. Thus, it is debatable whether the U.S. position 
is consistent with customary international law. J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW SYSTEM 1126-27(2d ed. 1981). See generally, Garcia-Amador, The Proposed New International Economic 
Order: A New Approach to the Law Governing Natwnalization and Compensatwn, 12 LAW. AM. 1 (1980); 
Goldie, State Responsibility and the Expropriation of Property, 12 INT'L LAW. 63 (1978). 
81. Baneee, 103 S. Ct. at 2594. See also infra note 84. 
82. Baneec, 505 F. Supp. at 418. Shortly thereafter, on February 23, 1961, the Cuban government 
dissolved Bancec. 103 S. Ct. at 2594. It assigned claims and functions relating to Bancec's banking 
business to Banco Nacional and those relating to its trading function to the Ministry of Foreign Trade. 
Id. On March 1, 1961, the Ministry of Foreign Trade created Empresa Cubana de Exportaciones 
(Empresa) and authorized it to conduct those commercial export transactions previously handled by 
Bancec. !d. The Ministry assigned a portion of Bancec's capital that it had previously received to 
Empresa. Id. 
On December 31, 1961, The Cuban government dissolved Empresa, created Empresa Cubana de 
Azucar y sus Derivados (Cubazucar) the following day, and assigned Empresa's rights relating to sugar 
commerce to Cubazucar as a state trading company.ld. The fact that the Cuban government retained 
control over Bancec's assets and assigned them as it desired supports the claim that Bancec was an alter 
ego of the Cuban government. Brief for Petitionee for Certiorari at 19-20,Bancee, 103 S. Ct. 2591. This 
argument, however, was not discussed by the Court. 
83. Baneee, 505 F. Supp. at 428. The court did not define alter ego. In corporate law, an alter ego 
relationship exists "when there is such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities 
of the corporation and the owners cease to exist." Ize Nantan Bagowa, Ltd. V. Scalia, 577 P.2d 725, 728 
(Ariz. App. 1978). One-hundred percent ownership of the stock of a corporation does not, in and of 
itself, result in an alter ego relationship between the sole shareholder and the corporation. Farmers 
Feed and Supply CO. V. United States, 267 F. Supp. 72, 76 (N.D. Iowa 1967). 
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dismissed the complaint because the value of the confiscated branches exceeded 
the amount of Bancec's claim.84 
The Second Circuit reversed the district court decision, holding that because 
Bancec had no role in the expropriation, it was not an alter ego of the Cuban 
government for purposes of Citibank's counterclaim.85 It distinguished the in-
stant case from those involving Banco Nacional as plaintiff1l6 because Banco 
Nacional had taken part in the expropriation that was the basis of the coun-
terclaim.87 The court dismissed the counterclaim, found in favor of Bancec, and 
directed that Citibank pay the judgment in accordance with the Cuban Asset 
Control Regulations.88 
3. The Supreme Court Decision 
The Supreme Court, in reviewing the court of appeals dismissal of the coun-
terclaim,89 recognized conflicting considerations. The Court realized that the 
separate status of government instrumentalities generally should be respected 
and, based on this consideration alone, the setoff disallowed.90 The Court also 
noted, however, it would be unfair to allow Bancec to recover on the letter of 
credit because the government of Cuba would be the ultimate beneficiary of such 
a recovery.91 
The Court stated that the Cuban government could not sue in U.S. courts 
without subjecting itself to Citibank's counterclaim.92 The Court indicated that to 
84. Baneee, 505 F. Supp. at 467. Citibank claimed the value of its losses was in excess of$5 million or 
$9 million, depending upon the valuation technique. [d. at 465. In contrast, the amount demanded on 
the letter of credit was $193,280. /d. at 424. The appellate court did not determine the exact amount of 
Citibank's losses, but held that those losses exceeded amounts already recovered and therefore allowed 
the setoff. [d. at 467. For a further discussion of the valuation of expropriation claims, see A. 
LOWENFELD, EXPROPRIATION IN THE AMERICAS 7 (1971); Chase, 658 F.2d at 887. 
85. Banete, 658 F.2d at 919-20. 
86. See supra note 51. 
87. Banete, 658 F.2d at 918. See also supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text. 
88. Baneee, 658 F.2d at 920. The Cuban Asset Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.101-515.809 
(1983), were enacted pursuant to subchapter V, Claims Against Cuba and China, of Chapter 21 -
Settlement of International Claims, 22 U.S.C. §§ 1643-1643(k)(1976). Subchapter V gives the Foreign 
Settlement Claims Commission, established pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 1622 (1976), authority to "deter-
mine the amount and validity of claims against the Government of Cuba." /d. at § 1643. The regulations 
provide that property, including "claims, obligations or other evidence of indebtedness," cannot be 
transferred to Cuba, but setoffs against such property are permitted. 31 C.F.R. § 515.205. 
89. 103 S. Ct. 2591 (1983). Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Burger and Justices White. Marshall, Powell, and Rehnquist joined. Justice Stevens, joined by 
Justices Brennan and Blackmun, concurred in part and dissented in part. 
90. Banet<, 103 S. Ct. at 2593, 2600. See infra notes 185-193 and accompanying text. 
91. Banete, 103 S. Ct. at 2603. 
92. [d. Set National Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955). This decision was codified in the 
FSIA, which reads in relevant part: 
In any action brought by a foreign state ... in a court of the United States or of a State, the 
foreign state shall not be accorded immunity with respect to any counterclaim ... (c) to the 
extent that the counterclaim does not seek relief exceeding in amount or differing in kind 
from that sought by the foreign state. 
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give effect to Bancec's separate status would allow Cuba relief it otherwise could 
not obtain without waiving its sovereign immunity.93 This equitable concern had 
been expressed by the Court in an earlier case: "We have a foreign government 
invoking our law but resisting a claim against it which fairly would curtail its 
recovery. It wants our law, like any other litigant, but it wants our law free from 
the claims of justice."94 
Since no equitable principles were precisely on point, the Court relied on a 
general equitable principle, found in both international law and federal common 
law,95 pertaining to private corporations.96 The principle states that a corpora-
tion is not always considered legally separate from its owners and that the 
corporate form can be disregarded if fraud or injustice is involved.97 For exam-
ple, if a shareholder cannot bring a particular cause of action because of equita-
ble principles, the corporation cannot bring it either.98 In this case, Bancec is the 
corporation and the government of Cuba is the shareholder.99 The Court rea-
soned that, since Cuba could not sue in its own name without being subject to the 
counterclaim,lOo neither should Bancec be allowed to sue free from a coun-
terclaim.lol 
While the setoff in Bancec could be based on equitable principles found in the 
law of corporations, the Court was also moved by practical considerations. It 
expressed concern that if it did not allow the setoff, governments could create 
juridical entities in order to avoid the requirements of international law .102 The 
equitable concerns and practical considerations expressed by the Court out-
weighed the presumption of a separate juridical status of a government entity 
and led the Court to allow the setoff. l03 It therefore reversed and remanded the 
28 U.S.C. § 1607 (1976). See also supra note 2 (discussion of sovereign immunity) and Note, The Castro 
Government in American Courts: Sovereign Immunity and the Act of State Doctrine, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1607, 
1613 (1962). 
93. Bancec, 103 S. Ct. at 2603. 
94. National Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. at 361-62. 
95. Federal common law has been defined as a "body of decisional law untrammeled by state court 
decisions." Lyons v. Howard, 250 F.2d 912, 915 (1st Cir. 1958), rev'd, 360 U.S. 593, reh'g denied, 361 U.S. 
854 (1959). 
96. Bancec, 103 S. Ct. at 2601. 
97. Id. See 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 43 (rev. perm. ed. 
1983), for a description of a growing body of law that disregards the corporate entity when the level of 
control exercised over it by another corporation makes it, in effect, "an instrumentality, agency, conduit 
or adjunct" of that other corporation. See also E. LATTY AND G. FRAMPTON, BASIC BUSINESS ASSOCIATION 
699 (1963). 
98. Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostock Railroad Co., 417 U.S. 703, 713 (1974). 
99. See supra note 70. 
100. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text. 
101. Bancec, 103 S. Ct. at 2594. But see Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., 549 F. Supp. 
857,859 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (the prohibition against piercing the corporate veil is especially important in 
cases involving foreign government-owned corporations). 
102. Bancec, 103 S. Ct. at 2603-04. See infra notes 204-211 and accompanying text. See also supra note 
80 on whether Cuba violated international law. 
103. Bancec, 103 S. Ct. at 2593. 
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case to the court of appeals to determine whether the value of Citibank's Cuban 
assets exceeded Bancec's claim}04 
In so holding, the Court put considerable weight on the finding of the district 
court that Bancec had been dissolved into the Ministry of Trade and Banco 
Nacional,lo5 either one of which could be liable, arguably, for acts of the Cuban 
government. I06 The Ministry of Foreign Trade, however, apparently had acted 
only as a trustee in the transfer of Bancec's assets, including this claim,I°7 to 
Empresa, another juridically autonomous government entity.lo8 If the Ministry 
did indeed act only as a trustee and did not hold the assets in its own right, then 
Bancec had been dissolved, in effect, into Banco Nacional and Empresa. This 
weakens the Court's argument that Bancec was dissolved into two entities which 
were alter egos of Cuba for purposes of the expropriation.lo9 It is difficult to 
imagine an entity more removed from its government's act of expropriation than 
Empresa, since it did not even exist at the time of the expropriationllo and was 
the successor in interest to only those of Bancec's claims which involved commer-
cial transactions.1II 
As a general rule, the United States claims to give effect to the separate 
juridical status of foreign government entities.1I2 The Bancec Court recognized 
that foreign governments establish these entities for a variety of reasons and 
that, for economic reasons as well as due to principles of comity, courts should 
generally treat these entities as separate from their respective governments.1I3 
But when confronted with the issue, the Supreme Court held that the presump-
tion of Bancec's separate legal status was overcome by the circumstances of the 
104. [d. at 2604. 
105. See supra note 82. 
106. Baneec. 103 S. Ct. at 2595 n.5. The court of appeals referred to this dissolution only in passing. 
658 F.2d at 916 n.4. The fact that there was an attemptto substitute Cuba as plaintiffin 1961. 103 S. Ct. 
at 2594. implies that Cuba was the real party in interest. 
107. The district court stated that this claim probably should be considered among those assets of 
Bancec that vested to Banco Nacional. but it never had to reach a definite conclusion since both Banco 
Nacional and the Ministry of Foreign Trade could be considered alter egos of Cuba. 505 F. Supp. at 
424-25. 
108. Baneec. 103 S. Ct. at 2605. 
109. The court in De Letelier v. Republic of Chile stated that Bancec's only connection with the 
Cuban government "was a period of less than a week during which Bancec's assets passed through the 
Cuban Ministry of Foreign Trade." 567 F. Supp. 1490. 1496 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
110. See supra notes 50 &: 82. 
III. See supra note 82. If Empresa were to be subject to a counterclaim based on the expropriation. 
then the precedential value of this case could be that whenever an expropriation occurs. entities of the 
expropriating government will be subject to a counterclaim for the unreimbursed losses. regardless of 
the autonomous status of that entity. This very broad rule appears to be favored by the U.S. govern-
ment. which took the position that the opinion of the Second Circuit would severely limit the ability of 
the United States to raise expropriation claims. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on 
Petition for Certiorari at 6. Baneec. 103 S. Ct. 2591. 
112. Baneec. 103 S. Ct. at 2600. 
113. [d. 
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case, as the Court believed that the Cuban government would be the ultimate 
beneficiary of any decision which respected Bancec's separate status.n4 In the 
future, therefore, parties dealing with these government entities will be unable 
to predict whether U.S. courts will consider these entities separate or a part of 
the government which created them. This uncertainty does not exist in England. 
IV. ENGLISH TREATMENT OF AUTONOMOUS GoVERNMENT ENTITIES 
English courts follow a rule similar to the general rule in U.S. courts; English 
courts recognize the separate juridical status of foreign government entities.1I5 
The English courts, however, have not deviated from this general rule, as 
indicated by the three English cases cited by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bancec.1I6 
Although these cases do not involve a setoff, they do involve government entities 
with many of the same characteristics as the Cuban state trading corporation 
Bancec.ll7 For this reason, the cases are indicative of how English courts might 
handle the issue presented in Bancec if and when they are confronted with it. 
A. Trendtex 
In Trendtex Trading Corporation v. Central Bank of Nigeria,1I8 the court consid-
ered the relationship between the Central Bank of Nigeria, a government entity, 
and the Nigerian government.119 The Nigerian government had instituted im-
port controls on cement to alleviate shipping congestion in Nigerian ports.120 
Pursuant to these import controls, the Central Bank of Nigeria refused to honor 
its obligations under various irrevocable letters of credit to Trendtex,l21 a Swiss 
corporation that was to supply the cement to an English trading company.122 One 
issue in the case was whether the Central Bank of Nigeria was an alter ego of the 
Nigerian government and therefore immune from suit under the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity.123 The court found that the functions of the bank were: to 
114. /d. at 2603. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
115. See infra note 177 and accompanying text. 
116. Baneec, 103 S. Ct. at 2600 n.18. The Court cited Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of 
Nigeria, [1976] 1 W.L.R. 868, [1977] 1 Q.B. 529 (C.A.); C. Czarnikow Ltd. v. Centralia Handlu 
Zagranicznego Rolimpex, [1978]1 Q.B. 176 (C.A.), 1979 A.C. 351; and I Congresodel Partido, [1978]1 
Q.B. 500, [1980] 1 LLOYD'S L.R. 23 (C.A.), 1983 A.C. 244. 
117. See infra notes 179-184 and accompanying text. 
118. [1976] I W.L.R. 868, [1977] 1 Q.B. 529 (C.A.) 
119. Trendtex, [1977] 1 Q.B. at 560. This case is important to English law for several reasons. The 
court clarified the application of international law in English courts and also discussed which entities 
may claim sovereign immunity and what activities entitle a state to claim immunity. Note, State Immunity 
and International Law in English Courts, 26 INT'L Be COMPo L. Q. 674, 677, 680 (1977). 
120. Trendtex, [1976] 1 W.L.R. at 871. 
121. Id. 
122. Trendtex, [1977] 1 Q.B. at 550. 
123. Trendtex, [1976] 1 W.L.R. at 873. 
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control the national currency; to handle exchange controls; to act as the state 
treasury; to supervise and regulate the banking industry; to act as banker for the 
provincial (state) governments; to generally advise the government; and to issue 
letters of credit in commercial transactions.124 The court found that these were 
essentially functions of the state of Nigerial25 and, for that reason, held that the 
bank was a department of the state and thus immune from suit in England.126 
The Court of Appeal, however, reversed this decision.127 Lord Justice 
Stephenson found that the Central Bank of Nigeria Actl2B established the bank 
as a separate entity, not as a government department.129 Since the bank had 
many of the duties of a bank and was capable of suing and being sued,130 Lord 
Justice Stephenson ruled that the bank was not a department of the Nigerian 
government and thus could not claim sovereign immunity.13I 
Lord Justice Shaw concurred in this decision.132 He stated that the basic factors 
to consider in determining whether the bank should have an independent legal 
status were its constitution, its powers and duties, and its activities.133 Noting that 
the Nigerian government had created the bank as a separate entity, not as a 
government department,134 Lord Justice Shaw found two particular functions of 
the bank to be indicative of the bank's independent status. First, the bank, not 
the government, had the sole right to issue notes. l35 Second, the bank acted as an 
ad visor to the federal government.136 Lord Justice Shaw stated that to ad vise the 
government, the bank had to be separate from that government.137 Finally, Lord 
Justice Shaw considered the expectations of the parties who might deal with the 
bank. 13B He felt that those parties would have no reason to believe the bank could 
claim sovereign immunity.139 
Based on these considerations, that the Nigerian government had established 
124. [d. at 876. These functions generally correspond to those discussed by U.S. courts in cases 
involving the Central Bank of Nigeria. See Texas Trading v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 
304 n.12 (2d Cir. 1981), mt. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982). 
125. The only purely banking function performed by the bank was the issuance of letters of credit in 
commercial transactions. Trendtex, [1976) 1 W.L.R. at 876. 
126. [d. at 877. 
127. Trendtex, [1977) I Q.B. at 580. 
128. See Trendtex, [1977) I Q.B. at 573-74, for a discussion of this legislation. 
129. [d. at 563. 
130. /d. 
131. [d. at 563, 565. See also Hispano v. Central Bank, [1979) 2 LLOYD'S L.R. 277, 278-79 (C.A.) 
(following Trendtex in holding that the Central Bank of Nigeria was separate from the state and 
therefore could not claim sovereign immunity). 
132. Trendtex, [1977) 1 Q.B. at 580. 
133. [d. at 573. 
134. [d. 
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the bank as a separate entity, that the bank's functions were indicative of this 
separate status, and that those dealing with the bank would presume it was 
independent, Lord Justice Shaw concluded that the bank was a separate entity 
from the government.140 The Central Bank of Nigeria, therefore, could not 
claim sovereign immunity and was amenable to the jurisdiction of the English 
courts.!4! 
B. C. Czarnikow 
The English Court of Appeal reconsidered the relationship between a gov-
ernment entity and the government which created it in C. Czarnikow Ltd. v. 
Centralia Handlu Zagranicznego Rolimpex.!42 In this 1978 case, the Polish state 
enterprise!43 Rolimpex contracted to sell sugar to C. Czarnikow Ltd., an English 
sugar merchant.!44 When the Polish Minister of Foreign Trade and Shipping 
banned the export of sugar, Rolimpex was unable to meet its contractual obliga-
tions.!45 Rolimpex then claimed that a force majeure clause,!46 which excused 
performance if prevented by government intervention, released it from liability 
for nonperformance of the contract.!47 The piaintifP48 contended that because 
Rolimpex was a Polish state enterprise, the actions of the Polish government 
could not be separated from those of Rolimpex; therefore, the government 
intervention was not beyond the seller's control, as required for the force 
majeure clause to be effective.!49 The court ruled, however, that Rolimpex and 
the Polish government were not the same entity!50 and that Rolimpex could 
therefore rely on the force majeure clause.!5! 
140. Lord Denning, the third justice, also felt that the bank was not a department of Nigeria, but 
found the question difficult, since the bank did perform some government functions and was subject to 
government control. For this reason, he based his decision on the commercial exception to sovereign 
immunity. Id. at 560. 
141. !d. at 580. 
142. [1978] 1 Q.B. 176 (C.A.), 1979 A.C. 351. 
143. A state enterprise is "a unit or organisation of the socialist economy which is created with the 
aim of providing for social needs within a specific sphere of activity defined in the decree or order which 
establishes it." Rolimpex, [1978] 1 Q.B. at 179. 
144. !d. at 190. 
145. Rolimpex, 1979 A.C. at 362. 
146. A force majeure clause protects a party from liability when nonperformance is due to circum-
stances beyond its control. Hong Guan & Co. Ltd. v. R. Jumabhoy & Sons Ltd., 1960 A.C. 684, 700. 
147. Rolimpex, [1978] 1 Q.B. at 193. 
148. Rolimpex differed from TrendJex in that the English plaintiff was arguing that the government 
entity should be considered a part of the government. In Trendlex, the plaintiff successfully argued that 
the Central Bank of Nigeria was a separate entity that could not claim sovereign immunity. See supra 
notes 131 & 140 and accompanying text. 
149. Rolimpex, [1978]1 Q.B. at 194. Cf.1 Congreso, [1978]1 Q.B. at 529 (a sovereign normally cannot 
plead force majeure when it is the sovereign who has intervened). 
150. Rolimpex, [1978] 1 Q.B. at 200. 
151. !d. In so doing, the court upheld the decision of an arbitration panel, which had been affirmed 
by the trial court. !d. at 181. The unpublished trial court opinion of December 13, 1976 was referred to 
in I Congreso, [1978] I Q.B. at 532. 
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The House of Lords affirmed the decision. ls2 It considered that while Rolim-
pex was subject to the direction of a government minister, it did have a separate 
personality, making its own decisions on commercial activity, such as choosing 
with whom and on what terms to do business. ls3 The Polish government ex-
pected Rolimpex to make a profit and managed it on the basis of economic 
accountability.ls4 The state treasury was not responsible for the financial obliga-
tions of Rolimpex, and Rolimpex was not responsible for those of the state. ISS In 
addition, because Rolimpex had a legal personality, it could not claim sovereign 
immunity under Polish law.IS6 
Under these circumstances, the court ruled that Rolimpex and the Polish 
government were not so closely connected as to preclude Rolimpex from relying 
on the sugar export ban as government intervention beyond its control.IS7 
Rolimpex was thus released from liability because of the force majeure clause.158 
This decision is consistent with Trendtex and demonstrates the desire of the 
English courts to respect the independent status of government entities, even 
when the result denies a substantial recovery to an English plaintiff.1s9 
C. I Congreso del Partido 
The most recent and perhaps clearest case indicating the policy of English 
courts to respect the independent status of foreign government entities is I 
Congreso del Partido .160 This case concerned a contract for the sale of sugar 
between Cubazucar,161 a Cuban trading enterprise, and lansa, a Chilean com-
pany.162 Mambisa, another Cuban state trading enterprise, operated the ships 
which were to deliver the sugar.163 The Cuban government exercised overall 
direction and control over Cubazucar and Mambisa and provided the funds 
necessary for their operation.164 The trading companies, however, made their 
own decisions regarding day-to-day commercial matters.16S The court recog-
nized that these companies were very similar to the Polish organization Rolim-
152. Rolimpex, 1979 A.C. at 373. 
153. [d. at 367. 
154. [d. 
155. [d. at 369. 
156. [d. 
157. !d. at 367. 
158. !d. at 373. 
159. Rolimpex, 1979 A.C. at 361. See also Lesser, Rolimpex: A Sweet Solution to Legal Success, 128 NEW L. 
J. 591, 592 Uune 15, 1978). 
160. [1978] 1 Q.B. 500, [1980] 1 LLOYD'S L.R. 23 (C.A.), 1983 A.C. 244. 
161. Cubazucar was a legal successor to Bancec. See supra note 82. 
162. [ Congreso, 1983 A.C. at 258. 
163. [d. The plaintiff claimed that the English courts had jurisdiction over this controversy because 
another ship under the control of Mambisa, the I Congreso del Partido, was located in England. [ 
Congreso, [1980] 1 LLOYD'S L.R. at 27. 
164. [Congreso, 1983 A.C. at 258. 
165. [ Congreso, [1980] I LLOYD'S L.R. at 25. 
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pex.166 When the Cuban government ordered that the contract not be per-
formed because of its intense dislike of the new Chilean government,167 Iansa 
sued Mambisa and the Republic of Cuba.168 
The Admiralty Court held that it had no jurisdiction over Mambisa or the 
Republic of Cuba and therefore dismissed the actions. 169 In so doing, it held that 
Cuba could plead sovereign immunity with respect to its actions.l1° Referring to 
Cubazucar and Mambisa, the court stated that they were examples of indepen-
dent state enterprises found in both western and socialist countries. l7l The court 
expressed concern that the actions of Cubazucar were being confused with 
actions of the Republic of Cuba.172 If Cubazucar and the Cuban government 
were considered one and the same, there would be no need to differentiate 
between their actions. 
The Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decisionl73 and agreed that 
Cubazucar and Mambisa were not departments of the Cuban government, but 
rather were independent entities.174 In so doing, the court recognized that 
commerce in Cuba was conducted by state trading enterprises rather than by 
private enterprises.175 
The House of Lords reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal and held 
that Cuba could not plead sovereign immunity.176 It agreed, however, with the 
lower courts' treatment of the Cuban state enterprises, as Lord Wilberforce 
stated: 
State-controlled enterprises, with legal personality, ability to trade 
and to enter into contracts of private law, though wholly subject to 
the control of their state, are a well-known feature of the modern 
commercial scene. The distinction between them, and their govern-
ing state, may appear artificial; but it is an accepted distinction in the 
law of England and other states.177 
Lord Wilberforce asserted that English law would not hold the sovereign state 
answerable for the actions of the independent entity,178 presumably because the 
166. [d. See supra notes 153-156 and accompanying text. 
167. I Congreso, [1978] 1 Q.B. at 512. 
168. [ Congreso, 1983 A.C. at 257. 
169. [ Congreso, [1978] 1 Q.B. at 533, 543. 
170. [d. at 533. The court had no jurisdiction over Mambisa because Mambisa did not own the I 
Congreso. [d. at 543. See supra note 163. 
171. [ Congreso, [1978] 1 Q.B. at 532. 
172. Id. 
173. [ Congreso, [1980] 1 LLOYD'S L.R. at 36. 
174. !d. at 25. 
175. Id. 
176. [Congreso, 1983 A.C. at 279. See Fox, State Immunity: The House of Lords' Decision in I Congreso del 
Partido, 98 L.Q. REV. 94 (1982) for a discussion of this decision. 
177. I Congreso, 1983 A.C. at 258. 
178. Id. at 271. This position is distinguishable from the position of the United States, as suggested by 
the RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. The U.S. 
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sovereign state intends the entity to be separate from the state. Thus, while the 
various English courts disagreed on whether Cuba could plead sovereign immu-
nity for actions having both political and commercial aspects, the courts did 
agree that these state trading entities should be considered independent from 
their governments. 
English courts, when faced with questions on the status of foreign government 
entities, have demonstrated a policy of allowing such entities to maintain their 
autonomous status. These courts have recognized that countries use government 
entities for a variety of purposes and, in so doing, intend them to be separate 
from the government. Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court in Bancec, the English 
courts have not yet allowed the circumstances of a particular case to override this 
policy, even in Rolimpex, when respect of the entity's separate status resulted in 
the denial of a recovery to the English plaintiff. 
V. ANALYSIS 
Although the precise issues in the U.S. and English cases were different, the 
government entities were similar. The governments creating the entities had 
established them with a separate legal personality,179 which gave the entities the 
capacity to sue and be suedl80 and to enter into contracts. 181 The entities were 
established to engage in some economic undertaking that, in every case but 
Trendtex, involved state trading.182 A financial relationship existed between each 
entity and its respective government,l83 and the governments all maintained 
some level of managerial control over the entity.184 
When a court disregards the independent status of a foreign government 
entity, several negative ramifications may result. The use of these entities is an 
accepted manner of engaging in commerce in many countries. Commercial 
dealings involving such countries could be adversely affected if other countries 
ignored the independent status of these entities. l85 For example, third parties 
Supreme Court, in discussing I Congreso, stated that English courts are reluctant to attribute the actions 
of a state to an entity of the state. Bancec, 103 S. Ct. at 2600 n.18. 
179. See supra notes 22, 66, 129, 153, & 174 and accompanying text. 
180. See, e.g., supra notes 22 & 130 and infra note 210 and accompanying text. 
181. See, e.g., supra notes 22, 144 & 177, and infra note 210 and accompanying text. 
182. See, e.g., supra notes 67, 144 & 161 and accompanying text. 
183. For example, the Cuban government provided the funds necessary for the operation of Bancec, 
Mambisa, and Cubazucar. See supra notes 70 & 164 and accompanying text. The profits of Bancec and 
the Central Bank of Nigeria were remitted to their respective governments. See supra note 72 and 
accompanying text; Trenlhex, [1976]1 W.L.R. at 875. Neither the Cuban government in Bancec nor the 
Polish government in Rolimpex was responsible for the debts of the respective government entity. See 
supra note 155 and infra note 211 and accompanying text. 
'184. See supra notes 26, 73, 153 & 164 and accompanying text. 
185. Brief for Respondent at 4, Bancec, 103 S. Ct. 2591; Note, The Separate Entity Fiction Exposed: 
Disregarding Self-Serving Recitals of Juridical Autonomy in Nationalization Cases, 6 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 288, 
303 (1983). Cf. Texas Trading v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d at 315-16. 
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might be unwilling to extend credit to a government entity if the assets of that 
entity could be used to satisfy a claim against the sovereign.186 Failure to recog-
nize an entity's independent status could also affect the ability of developing 
countries to make large scale national investments, since these countries often 
use public development corporations to obtain the financing necessary for such 
projects. 187 
The United States would not want foreign countries to disregard the separate 
status of U.S. corporations and their independent subsidiaries. If this separate 
status were ignored, assets of the U.S. parent corporation could be used to satisfy 
claims against an independent subsidiary, an approach contrary to the nature of 
the corporate form.188 Congress was concerned with this problem when it 
enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, as it indicated that the failure by 
the United States to recognize an entity's separate juridical status could lead to 
such a result.189 
In addition, the United States uses independent government entities,190 some 
of which engage periodically in international commercial transactions. l91 Plain-
tiffs bringing suit based on the actions of an entity should sue the entity itself, 
and not the U.S. government.192 Similarly, if the entity brings suit, it seems 
undesirable for the entity to be subject to a setoff based on claims held by the 
defendant against the United States. Yet if U.S. courts fail to draw this distinc-
tion between a foreign government and its independent entities, the United 
States is not in a strong position to complain when foreign courts fail to do SO.193 
English courts acknowledge these considerations and thus have recognized 
entities as separate from their governments.194 They have not moved in the 
direction of the Bancec Court, regardless of the facts of a specific case.195 Indeed, 
the Court's rationale in Bancec is not very convincing. For example, the Court, in 
expressing equitable concerns, indicated that it would be an injustice to give 
effect to Bancec's separate juridical status and disallow the setoff. 196 Such a 
conclusion, however, does not necessarily follow. 197 The Court recognized that a 
186. Baneee, 103 S. Ct. at 2600. 
187. [d. at 2599. See also U.N. Study, supra note 22, at 18-20. 
188. See generally Note, Liability of a Corporation for Acts of a Subsidiary or Affiliate, 71 HARV. L. REV. 
1122,1122-23 (1958); Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEX. L. REV. 979, 979 (1971); H. HENN &J. 
ALEXANDER, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 355 (1983). 
189. REpORT, supra note 58, at 29-30, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 6628-29. 
190. See A. WALSH, THE PUBLIC'S BUSINESS 34-36 (1978), for a 1976 survey of U.S. government 
corporations. 
191. Gibbons v. Republic of Ireland, 532 F. Supp. 668, 671-72 (D.D.C. 1982). 
192. [d. 
193. [d. at 672. See also supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
194. See, e.g., supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
195. See, e.g., supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
196. Baneee, 103 S. Ct. at 2603. 
197. [d. at 2605 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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judgment for Bancec would not result in a payment to Bancec or the Republic of 
Cuba, since these amounts would be frozen pursuant to the Cuban Asset Control 
Regulations.198 By allowing the setoff, the Court enabled Citibank to recover one 
hundred percent of its losses, to the extent of Bancec's claim.199 If the Court had 
not allowed the setoff, the judgment eventually might have been used as partial 
conpensation, on a proportional basis, to any party who suffered losses as a result 
of the Cuban expropriation and who had subsequently filed claims with the 
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission.2°O Had this occurred, Citibank would 
have received the same proportional settlement as other claimants and would not 
have received a preference because it was liable to Bancec on an independent 
matter.201 
Given the extensive control the Cuban government exercised over Bancec, 
their relationship arguably was that of parent and subsidiary corporation. If so 
argued, a finding of liability against Bancec for the acts of Cuba is not compelled. 
Judge Learned Hand stated that if it were at all possible to hold a subsidiary 
liable for the acts of its parent, such instances would be extremely rare.202 
Furthermore, if the level of control by Cuba over Bancec was such that an agency 
relationship existed, with Cuba the principal and Bancec its agent, allowance of 
the setoff does not necessarily result. By allowing the setoff, the Court has held 
Bancec liable for the actions of the Cuban government. Yet it is axiomatic, in the 
law of agency, that an agent is not responsible for the acts of its principal.2oa 
The Court expressed concern that giving effect to the claimed separate status 
of an entity such as Bancec would allow foreign governments to create separate 
juridical entities to avoid the requirements of international law.204 While con-
cerns about the use of these entities for this reason are not without merit, neither 
are they particularly convincing. The first way a government might accomplish 
this goal is by excluding an entity from participation in the expropriation if that 
entity were subject to suit in the United States.205 This assumes, however, that a 
foreign state will have the devious foresight, when expropriating property or 
committing some other alleged violation of international law, to consider which 
198. [d. at 2602 n.24 and 2604 n.2. 
199. This argument was set out in detail in Citibank, 431 F.2d at 404 n.18. See also Justice Brennan's 
dissent in the appeal of that case. 406 U.S. at 794. 
200. Citibank, 431 F.2d at 404. 
201. /d. An analogy to a bankruptcy is revealing. In such a case, the setoff would be allowed, 
assuming mutuality of interest was present, notwithstanding the alleged unfairness of allowing such a 
setoff. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, ~~ 553.02, 553.03 (15th ed. 1983). 
202. Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F.2d 265, 267 (2d Cir. 1929),quoted 
with approval in FMC Finance Corp. v. Murphree, 632 F.2d 413, 422 (5th Cir. 1980). See also FLETCHER, 
supra note 97, at § 43.60. 
203. See, e.g., King v. City of Beaumont, 296 F. 531, 534 (E.D. Texas 1924) (agent not liable for tort 
committed by its principal). 
204. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
205. Comment, Foreign Expropriation Cases in the United States: Conflicting Legislation and Judicial 
Policies, 17 U.S.F. L. REV. 117, 139 (1982). 
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of its entities are subject to suit in the United States and to avoid their involve-
ment in the prohibited conduct. In the Bancec case, for example, no evidence 
indicated that the Cuban government had established Bancec to avoid potential 
liability in U.S. courtS.206 In fact, Bancec had been established before the expro-
priation of Citibank's property.207 
Second, a foreign government could avoid counterclaims by carefully selecting 
the entity through which to bring suit in the United States.20B For example, it 
would not bring suit in the United States through an entity that had participated 
in an act violating international law.209 This method assumes that a foreign 
government will have a choice as to which entity brings suit, so that by carefully 
selecting that entity, the foreign government will avoid counterclaims based on 
the conduct either of the government itself or of another entity. Since the party 
bringing suit must have a cause of action in its own right, and only one entity 
might be in the position of having a particular cause of action, this is an 
unreasonable and farfetched assumption. In Bancec, Bancec was suing on its own 
cause of action. Bancec, not the Republic of Cuba, was the party to the letter of 
credit.210 The Cuban government was not responsible for Bancec's debts, nor 
Bancec for those of the government.211 There was no choice, therefore, as to 
which entity could bring suit. 
Since allowing Bancec to recover would arguably have been fair, and since 
there was no indication that Cuba had established Bancec to avoid the require-
ments of international law, the Supreme Court could have respected the sepa-
rate juridical status of Bancec and dismissed the counterclaim. Given the deci-
sions in Trendtex, C. Czarnikow, and I Congreso, an English court would have 
dismissed the counterclaim, had it been deciding the Bancec case. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Members of the business community desire certainty in business dealings.212 
The Court in Bancec has introduced an element of vagueness into any determi-
nation of whether a government entity will be considered independent from its 
government. This decision will result in increased uncertainty regarding the 
status of these government entities and has the potential to seriously disrupt 
commercial dealings involving them. 
206. See also Brieffor Respondent at 14, Bancee, 103 S. Ct. 2591. Cf. Minpeco S.A. v. Conticommodity 
Services, Inc., 549 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N .Y. 1982) (court gave effect to the separate status of a state-owned 
corporation since there was no evidence the corporate form had been manipulated or abused). 
207. See supra notes 50 &: 66 and accompanying text. 
208. Comment, supra note 205, at 139. 
209. Note, supra note 185, at 296. 
210. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
211. See Joint Appendix to Petitioner's and Respondent's Brief at 190, Baneee, 103 S. Ct. 2591. 
212. Fox, supra note 176, at 95; James v. Bell Helicopter Co., 715 F.2d 166, 173 (5th Cir. 1983). 
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Although courts in the United States and in England have reached the same 
conclusion - that the independent status of foreign government entities gener-
ally should be respected - they have differed when deciding the merits of a 
particular case. While the U.S. Supreme Court failed to give effect to the 
separate juridical status of a government entity, English courts have consistently 
given effect to their independent status. Had an English court decided Bancec, it 
probably would have reached the opposite result and respected Bancec's sepa-
rate status. 
The specific equitable and practical concerns expressed by the Bancec Court, 
however, did not compel a decision to disregard the independence of the 
government entity in that case. Furthermore, the ramifications of the Bancec 
precedent are potentially far more significant than the perceived inequity of that 
one case. Although the Court has spoken, more litigation involving this issue is 
likely. Should such litigation occur, the Court should reconsider its holding in 
Bancec and follow the English lead, thereby giving respect to the independent 
status of a government entity. 
Paul E. Bouton 
